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FREEDOM, NORMS AND NATURE IN HEGEL: SELF-LEGISLATION OR SELF-
REALIZATION? 
Robert Stern 
 
One of the many things that make ǯ    is deciding 
where to place him in the dispute between the ancients and the moderns Ȃ a 
polarity which he himself played a large part in popularizing. This is because on 
the one hand, Hegel often goes out of his way to emphasize the comparative 
richness and attractiveness of classical thought, as against the superficial and 
reductive outlook of the moderns; on the other hand, he is in no doubt about the 
historical significance of the modern world, and how in many ways the ancient 
world had to be surpassed. As Hegel puts it with characteristic ambivalence in 
the Phenomenology with reference to Greek ethiǡǲReason must withdraw    ǳ (PhG 267/214): while the transition is somehow 
inevitable and required, what is left behind still represents something of an ideal 
which is lost. And it is clear that Hegel holds that some moderns have gone too 
far away from the wisdom of the ancients, with Kant as one prominent example 
amongst others. 
 Still, this leaves the commentator on Hegel needing to strike a balance, 
and different options are available. One of the distinctive features of Robert ǯ   ǡ  ǡ     ǯ
commitment to the modern central to his reading. Thus, while acknowledging 
the s     ǯ ǡ     ǯ ǡ    post-Kantianism, that makes him a key 
philosophical figure. Of course, what Kantianism and thus post-Kantianism 
amount to is itself highly contestable. Nonetheless, understandably enough, for  ǯǡ
lost Ȃ ǯ
philosophy. 
 When it comes to the theoretical philosophy, this outlook is articulated 
most clearly in the Introduction to the now-classic ǯ , in what I ǯǣ 
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More to the general and more obvious point, however, much of the 
standard view of how Hegel passes beyond Kant into speculative 
philosophy makes very puzzling, to the point of unintelligibility, how 
Hegel could have been the post-Kantian philosopher he understood   Ǣ  ǡ     ǡ   ǡ ǯ
revelations about the fundamental inadequacies of the metaphysical 
tradition, could have enthusiastically agreed with Kant that the ǲǳ, of substance, and of traditional views of God 
and infinity were forever discredited, and then could have promptly            ǯ
critical epistemology. Just attributing moderate philosophic intelligence 
to Hegel should at least make one hesitate before construing him as a 
post-Kantian philosopher with a precritical metaphysics. (Pippin 1989: 7) 	  ǡ  ǯ
idealism, which while of course it goes beyond Kant in significant respects, still 
has a recognizably transcendental flavour Ȃ a flavour that has not endeared ǯǤ 
 Similarly,  ǯ   ǯ  ǡ   ǯ       reedom as self-
legislation, notwithstanding their other well-known differences. For Pippin, this 
goes along with a characteristically modern move away from nature and thus 
from any sort of Aristotelian naturalism in ethics; the puzzles that arise for 
Kantian self-    ǯ   , and the move   Ǯǯ   Ǯǯ. So for Pippin, again, while Hegel undoubtedly drew 
something from the Greeks, his outlook is fundamentally a modern one, and 
highly indebted to Kant, despite their less significant divergences. 
 Others, however, have put the emphasis in a different place in their 
reading of Hegel, seeking to push the balance more in favour of the Greeks than 
Pippin seems inclined to do, whether this is Plato, Neo-Platonism or Aristotle, or 
some combination of the three. In theoretical philosophy, this has led to more 
Platonic or Aristotelian readings of the Logic in particular, which treat it less as a 
 3 ǲour conceptual schemeǳ1 and more as an ontological 
inquiry into the fundamental structure of being qua being. Of course, those 
emphasizing the ancient over the modern in this way must pay due attention to ǯ. They too must respect ǯ to this extent; but they will claim to do so without needing to 
take as much of the transcendental turn as Pippin himself appears to think is 
necessary if the Principle is to be respected. I have argued elsewhere that this 
can perhaps be achieved.2 
   ǡ ǡ       ǯ 
philosophy from this perspective, but his practical philosophy. For, the same 
debate concerning ancient vs modern comes up here, where once again we find 
Pippin on the side of the moderns. Thus, those who take the other side must face    ǯ Principle in this arena too: just as Pippin thinks  ǲmode  ǳ to Hegel in theoretical 
philosophy means we must see him as taking the transcendental critique of 
metaphysics seriously, so he thinks attributing such intelligence to Hegel in          ǯ -legislation 
thesis seriously, in a way that makes a fundamental break with anything   Ǥ      ǯ   
wi  ǡ  ǡ   ǡ      ǯ
ethics remains in the Aristotelian perfectionist tradition, albeit a perfectionism of 
a significantly post-Kantian form.  
 I will begin by saying something about what I mean by perfectionism. I 
will then look at a dispute between John McDowell and Pippin where Pippin 
argues against any perfectionist reading of Hegel for failing to recognize the    ǯ ǡ     
commitments. I ǯǡǯǯ   ǡ as a perfectionism that relates to the 
                                                        
1  ? ? ? ?ǣ ?ǤǯLogic, however, it ǯ
turn. 
2 Cf. Stern 2009, and also Kreines 2015.  
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structure of the will of the rational agent, and is thus of a distinctively post-
Kantian kind. 
 
1. Perfectionism 
T    ǡ ǲpǳ remains the great unknown of 
ethics.  On the one hand, virtually all the great ethicists can be viewed as 
perfectionists in some broad sense Ȃ that is, as making some conception of the 
flourishing life for human beings, the realization of our fundamental capacities or 
natures, central to their ethics and social philosophy. What distinguishes them is 
their different accounts of what that flourishing consists in. Taken in this way, at 
least the following could be put on this list without raising great controversy: 
Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Leibniz, Rousseau, Marx, Nietzsche, Mill, 
Bradley, Green, and Dewey. The question I want to concentrate on here, which 
equally raises the question above ǯ the ancients 
and the moderns, is whether Hegel should be included as part of this tradition. I 
will do so by focusing on a recent dispute between McDowell and Pippin. 
Roughly speaking, the terms of the dispute are as follows. In some of his 
earlier papers on Aristotle, McDowell questions the way in which Aristotle 
should be considered to be a naturalist. Pippin takes that to show that nature has 
no place in ethics, thus cutting the ground out from under any perfectionist 
approach Ȃ but, he argues, McDowell fails to see this fully. Pippin thinks Hegel 
shows a more consistent repudiation of naturalism in his ethics, given the ǲǳǲǳ, which requires a shift towards Kantian 
self-legislation instead. On this account, norms are not to be derived from what is 
required for the proper realization of our nature qua human beings, but from the 
form of practical reason, to which Hegel then gives a historicist turn. I will argue, ǡǯLogic suggests that Pippin may be too quick to      ǯ  Ȃ so that while (like McDowell) 
Hegel may be taken as rejecting certain ways in which perfectionism might be 
developed, Pippin goes too far in claiming that he wanted to reject it altogether 
in favour of a more thoroughgoing Kantian position. As a result, I will argue, 
Hegel can legitimately be placed in the perfectionist canon after all. 
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In order to explain what I mean here by perfectionism, naturalism and self-
realization, it is helpful to start with a passage from Terence Irwin: 
[Aristotle] defends an account of the human good as happiness 
(eudaimonia), consisting in the fulfilment of human nature, expressed in 
the various human virtues. His position is teleological, in so far as it seeks 
the best guide for action in an ultimate end, eudaimonist, in so far as it 
identifies the ultimate end with happiness, and naturalist, in so far as it 
identifies virtue and happiness in a life that fulfils the nature and 
capacities of rational human nature. (Irwin 2007: 4)3 
So, according to the Aristotelian eudaemonist, the human good consists in 
happiness; human happiness consists in the fulfilment or realization of human 
nature; and human nature can be defined in terms of what capacities are 
essential to human beings, qua members of a natural kind. Thus, the good of a 
human being is that which promotes the species nature of the individual qua 
human being and their distinctive capacities, where virtuous action by individual 
will lead to their good/flourishing, by developing capacities in this way. So, we 
can take what it is that leads to human happiness, understood as the realization 
of human capacities, as a guide to action and thus as determining its norms and 
the character of the virtues. 
Now, while a position of this sort can be called eudaimonist, it can also be 
called perfectionist, because it takes happiness to consist in the proper 
development of our distinctive capacities, rather than simply pleasure or desire-
satisfaction. On the other hand, it may be distinguished from a narrower form of 
perfectionism, which takes this development to be a good in itself, rather than as 
an aspect of the well-being of the individual. Perfectionism in both these forms 
involves a picture of the proper development of our capacities as the kinds of 
creatures we are, and builds normativity out of that Ȃ which is what makes it a 
kind of naturalism. So the fundamental question is: can the appeal to nature do 
this kind of work, when it comes to human beings? 
                                                        
3 ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
study of the Aristotelian naturalist tradition in the context of the development of 
ethics. For a classic systematic study, see Hurka 1993. 
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This is the issue at the centre of the dispute between McDowell and 
Pippin that I want to look at further, as it relates to Hegel. 
 
2. McDowell on Aristotle 
The key paper         ǯ   ǲǳǡ ǯ
naturalism might be understood. One way might be to see Aristotle as trying to 
use his naturalism to convince people to be virtuous, as a way in which they 
might then flourish, and thus as a way of making their lives go well given their 
natures. But, McDowell argues (following others such as Bradley and Prichard),4 
this would be a mistake, for the reason why a virtuous agent would act nobly (for 
example) is that that action is noble; for any further reason related to flourishing 
to come into play would just detract from that, and give the virtuous person the 
wrong reasons to act ethically, based on their interests.  
Having made that fairly familiar point, McDowell adds a further argument 
more relevant to the later dispute with Pippin, namely that for us qua rational 
agents, appeals to what is natural to us and thus might enable us to flourish as 
natural beings can cut no ice anyway Ȃ so the approach is doomed from the start. 
McDowell illustrates the probleǲǳ, where ǲa rational wolf would be able to let his mind roam over possibilities of 
behaviour other than     ǳǡ  ǲthis reflects a 
deep connection between reason and freedom; we cannot make sense of a ǯ         
action, ǳ (McDowell 1996: 170). 
McDowell then considers how this rational wolf might respond faced with 
some behaviour that he sees comes naturally to wolves, such as hunting co-
operatively in a pack: because he is a rational wolf, he can step back and ask of ǲǫǳ. Once the question has arisen, McDowell ǡǲhow can it help to appeal to what wolves ǫǳ: ǲ     ǫǳ, says our reflective wolf, wondering 
whether to idle through the hunt but still grab his share of the prey. 
SupǡǣǲWolves need to pool their energies, if 
                                                        
4 Cf. Bradley 1927: 58-59; Prichard 1912 and 1929. 
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their style of hunting is to be efǤǳ If our wolf has stepped back from 
his natural impulse and taken up the critical stance, why should what we 
say impress him? (McDowell 1996: 171) 
What is the problem here? The difficulty is that while wolves in general, as a 
kind, may need to work co-operatively as a pack in a way that makes it best for ǡǯ
(as a rational wolf) is able to distinguish between the two (McDowell 1996: 172). 
 So, McDowell argues, if we do try to ground an appeal to virtue in some    ǡ ǯ     
kind as the individual can always question the significance of that to him- or 
herself. The only flourishing that will seem relevant will be individual flourishing, 
thereby collapsing ethics into self-interest. The lesson McDowell draws from this ǲgrounǳ ǡǲǳ should 
not be conceived of in this way: 
[Aristotleǯ] naturalism simply does not promise to validate putative 
rational requirements. That he is not concerned about grounding is 
anyway strongly suggested by the fact that he addresses his ethical 
lectures only to people who have been properly brought up. (McDowell 
1996: 174) 
Aristotelian naturalism in this first sense, as     ǲ  ǫǳ 
question is therefore rejected. 
McDowell then diagnoses why we (but not Aristotle) might feel the pull of 
such a grounding problem, which he traces back to our scientism and 
disenchanted view of the world, which leads us to lose sight of the idea that to 
the virtuous individual, tǲǳ reason giving 
without the need for grounding Ȃ by for example seeing that this would be cruel, 
and so not doing it, where this is the result of a form of upbringing that   ǲsecond naǳ.5 However, McDowell does not think that 
following Aristotle here therefore replaces considerations of our nature with just ǲsecond natureǳ, whereby the former would drop out altogether, and if it did, we 
would seem to have abandoned naturalism entirely. For McDowell thinks it is 
                                                        
5 For more on this theme, see McDowell 1994: 78-84. 
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still possible to give first nature an important role in ethics, but not as a response 
to the ǲǳ. 
McDowell identifies two other roles for it to fulfill. First, it is important ǲbecause the innate endowment of human beings must put limits on the shapings 
of second nature that ǳ (McDowell 1996: 190); that is, there 
are naturally defined limits to our capacities for reflection and enculturation that 
the processes of second nature can take. Second, from within the reflection of the 
virtuous agent, considerations of first nature related to flourishing will be the 
sort of thing that they will take ǲǳ 
regarding whether the practices and norms that have shaped their ethical 
sensibility are ultimately a good thing. This is not because they are wondering 
whether, qua individuals, they should adopt those practices (that is the 
grounding issue again), but rather, whether we as a group have done well to 
adopt them, given what our flourishing consists in: 
First nature matters not only ǥ in helping to shape the space in which 
reflection must take place, but also in that first-natural facts can be part of 
what reflection takes into account. This is where we can register the 
relevance of what human beings need in order to do well, in a sense of ǲ ǳ     ǯ ǲacting in accordance with the ǳ. Consider a rational wolf whose acquisition of practical reason 
included being initiated into a tradition in which co-operative behaviour 
in the hunt is regarded as admirable, and so as worth going in for in its 
own right. What wolves need might figure in a bit of reflection that might 
help reassure him that when he acquired a second nature with that shape, 
his eyes were opened to real reasons for acting. The reflection would be 
Neurathian, so it would not weigh with a wolf who has never acquired 
such a mode of valuation of conduct, or one who has come unstuck from 
it. And there would be no irrationality in thus failing to be convinced. But 
this need not undermine the reassurance, if the reflection that yields it is 
self-Ǥǯ
species need is not guaranteed to appeal to practical reason. But the point 
is harmless to the genuine rationality of virtue, which is visible (of 
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course!) only from a standpoint from which it is open to view. (McDowell 
1996: 190-1) 
McDowell hereby argues for a second sort of naturalism that is compatible with ǲa fun  ǳ, even if Aristotle himself (McDowell 
thinks) did not raise these questions    ǲis notably unconcerned to 
defend, against potential competitors, the way things look to the kind of person ǳ (McDowell 1996: 189). 
So, as I understand itǡ ǯ    Ǥ To the well-
brought up rational wolf (or human being), various kinds of co-operative 
behaviour will just seem to be what is called for in the situation, as the correct 
thing to do, and that will be their reason for doing it and why they act; for, in this 
sort of case, ǲWhat directly influences the will is the valuations of actions that ǳ (McDowell 1996: 191). Nonetheless, one can still 
seek ǲǳ about this upbringing and enculturation itself: for example, 
one might ask whether  ǲǳ explanation for it would be better, à la 
Nǲǳ.6 And this is where claims 
about our nature and flourishing can come in, to provide the reassurance that 
these practices and their norms relate to that nature in the right way.  
It is important to recognize, however, ǲǳ being 
considered here ǲǳ that the lone rational 
wolf was seeking: as ǲǳ the practice of virtue, he was 
looking for reasons to be moral that would lead to his individual good, where an 
appeal to what is good for wolves in general is not going to satisfy. But in looking 
for reassurance concerning the practices of our own enculturation Ȃ  ǲhelp 
reassure him that when he acquired a second nature with that shape, his eyes 
                                                        
6 Ǥ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ? ?ǣǲ 
outlook when reflection does break out, and they come to think, rightly or 
wrongly, that they have seen through the ǯ
cogency. If something is to be an intelligible candidate for being the way second 
nature should be, it must at least be intelligible that the associated outlook could ǳǤould seem to have become ǲǳǡǣǲcondemns as 
morality and not with regard to the aims and objects of life, it is a specific error 
with regard to which one should show no sympathy, an idiosyncrasy of the 
degenerate Ǩǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǣǲ-ǳȚ ?ǡǤ ? ?ȌǤ 
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were opǳ Ȃ ǯǣ
want to know rather that these practices are not merely distortive and corrupted 
ideological constructs, where seeing that that the practices are good for us as a 
whole, not just for the individual concerned, can help to provide us with the 
confidence we need. ǲǳ provided by the connection we ǲǳǲone remove from the ǯ  ǳ (McDowell 1996: 191): that is (I take it), what provides 
the agent in question with reasons to act still only comes from seeing the act as 
noble or courageous or whatever, not as conductive to well being either of the 
individual concerned or of group as a whole; but this latter connection can still      ǲreflective background for a second nature that values  ǳ (McDowell 1996: 191), where McDowell puts this idea as ǣǲThis should be seen as a case of a relation that Wittgenstein draws to 
our attention, between our concepts and the facts of nature that underlie them. 
The concepts would not be the same if the facts of (first) nature were different, 
and the facts help to make it intelligible that the concepts are as they are, but this 
does not mean that correctness and incorrectness in the application of the 
concepts can be captured by requirements spelled out at the level of the 
u ǳ (McDowell 1996: 193). In this way, then, McDowell offers an 
account of the place for perfectionism in ethics, and with it a kind of naturalism, ǲǳ designed to make sense to someone outside 
our ethical practices, but as a legitimate way of reflecting on them from within.7  ǯǡ
Hegel to challenge the role that McDowell gives to nature.  I will suggest that 
Pippin misses an important aspect of that role, and so also misrepresents the 
place of Hegel in these debates. 
 
3. Pippin on McDowell: Nature vs Spirit 
In his 2002 article, tellingly entitlǣǲǳ, Pippin focuses on 
the role McDowell gives to nature both in his theoretical and practical 
philosophy, but I will just concentrate on the latter. Pippin summarizes his point 
as follows: 
                                                        
7 See also McDowell 1980: 19 and Hursthouse 1999: 194. 
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My main question will be whether we gain that much, free ourselves from 
that much, if we can come to see our capacity for normative stances as ǲ- Ǥǳ I want to offer some suggestions that we are 
better off leaving nature out of the picture altogether, and that doing so 
begs no questions. This will offer a limited defense of what McDowell, in a ǡǲǤǳ (Pippin 2002: 60)  
And he thinks Hegel is on his side: 
Said v ǡ   ǲǳ  ǯ  ȋ
systematic account of forms of intelligibility, ever better explanatory 
adequacyȌǲǳǲǳǲǡǳ GeistǢǲǳ 
concerns more the inadequacy of appeals to nature as explicans. (Pippin 
2002: 60) 
For Pippin, therefore, what makes Hegel a modern thinker is this step away from   ǡ      ǯ 
commitments prevent him from appreciating in Hegel. As a result, ǯ    ǯ      (as 
grounding), but then to argue that this shows that we can do without nature 
altogether, and so arrive an account that is more purely social and historical in a 
way which Pippin thinks is more properly Hegelian. 
Pippin therefore ǯ
and flourishing cǲǳ ethics from the perspective of the individual who 
is outside ethics; but he thinks McDowell then misses that naturalism can then 
drop out altogether. T   ǯ ǲǳ question must 
come instead from an account of the historical development of the practices of 
the ethical community of which the individual is part: 
The question is: how does a claim of reason, or a commitment to an ideal 
or goal, become part of the fabric of some form of life? How is the 
achievement of a genuinely common mindedness (something quite 
different from a codified, explicit belief system, or subjective commitment 
to ideals) possible? How could there be a common mindedness such that 
our reactions to conduct that is objectionable have become so intimate 
and such a part of that fabric that the conduct being the sort of conduct it 
is counts thereby as reason enough to condemn it. But to understand this, 
 12  ǯ      ǡ  ǡ 
nature, and so forth. We nǲǳ in 
time. (Pippin 2002: 68)  
Pippin argues that the answeǲǳ question must take this form, 
as appeals to nature cannot carry any weight with us: what does it matter that 
the process of enculturation is soǲǳǡǲǳ 
mean here anyway? 
If the point is simply that given the various biological and neurological 
capacities we are endowed with by nature and evolution, human beings 
have (do as a matter of fact have) the capacity to make, sustain, hold 
themselves to and pass on in historical memory various kinds of 
normative institutions, and can form the characters such institutions 
require, and can create practices that allow for developing and revising 
the various claims for institutional authority inherent in such institutions, 
what is gained by declaring so insistently that all of this must be    ǲ   ǳ? To adopt Rortyean 
rhetoric, it sounds more like an attempt at an exaggerated compliment 
than a substantive point. (Pippin 2002: 69)  
The fundamental issue, for Pippin, is that ultimately we are free of nature, and in 
the end it must drop out of our ethical reflections in a way that (he thinks) Hegel 
saw and in a way that makes Hegel radically non-naturalist and non-
perfectionist, and so ultimately opposed to anything like McDowellǯǣ 
A culture (Bildung) in this sense, while it is something we must have the 
requisite natural, enabling capacities to build and sustain, is only 
something that we buiǤǲǳ then, directing us as 
it does toward the historical dissatisfactions and tensions responsible for 
the institutional change we effect, seems unproblematic enough and to be 
directing us properly towards history not nature as the domain where 
accounts of hum     Ǥ  ǯ ewhat  ǡǲGeistǳ is not non-natural or immaterial, it is ǲǳ. (Pippin 2002: 70) 	 ǡ ǡ          ǯ ǲǳ that our practices are as they ought to be, we can turn to history 
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rather than nature, where that history can be understood in dialectical terms, as 
the progressive overcoming of tensions and problems as we move forward Ȃ 
from slavery to universal rights, or from monarchy to democracy, for example. It 
is that historical process underlying our practices, rather than any appeal to first 
or second nature, that is needed to do the work: 
If Geist is a distinctive kind by not being a natural but a ǲ-ǳ 
kind, we could be said to be ǲǳ collectively the form of life, the 
institutional form of life especially, suited to such a historical, collectively 
self-determining being. This means that our analysis of this result is not 
essentialist or empirical  ǲǳ, a reconstruction in which 
the meaning of large-scale social and political change is integrated into a 
view of what, wholly internally, wholly in terms of their own self-
understanding, might count as progressive. (Pippin 2014: 729) 
 Th   ǯǯ
(albeit one partly inspired by Rousseau), namely the idea of self-legislation.8 For, 
not only is spirit able to free itself from nature, but it is able to authorize norms 
for itself, rather than have such norms given to it externally, where this is said to 
be a vital aspect of what it means to be autonomous. At the same time, according  ǡ ǯ  or this self-legislative account is seen by Hegel as too 
transcendental and ahistorical, where again it is the collective process of 
legislation through history that needs to be added to the basic Kantian story, a 
story which is distinctively modern.9 
Pippǯ case is undoubtedly a powerful one, on both interpretative and 
philosophical grounds. Nonetheless, I want to argue that it underestimates the 
significant perfectionist strand i ǯ ǡ   ignores something 
                                                        
8 Ǥ ? ? ? ?ǣ ? ?ǣǲǡǡ
image foǮǯ
German idealist tradition is legislative power, not empirical discrimination and 
deliberative judgment, and the force of this image of legislative power makes it 
difficult to integrate what McDowell says about the overall effect of Bildung Ȃ ǮǯǮǯȂ with the Kantian and even Hegelian ǳǤ 
9 Cf. also Pippin 2008: 91.  
 14   ǯ Ǥ  ǡ    ǯ
modernism means he is committed to abandoning Aristotelian naturalism 
altogether, I will argue that it rather means that this naturalism is transformed 
into a type of post-Kantian perfectionism, which is a perfectionism nonetheless.  
 
4. Hegelǯ 
When asserting ǲ Ǯǯǯǥ Ǯǯ Ǯǯ Ǯǡǯ Geistǳ, Pippin cites the relative insignificance  ǯ Philosophy of Nature to the rest of his system.ǣ ǲAs anyone who has 
slogged through it knows, there is a lot there that seems to turn no other wheel 
elsewhere in what Hegel says, and very little in the Philosophy of Spirit seems to 
dǳ (Pippin 2002: 60).  
Some might question whether this does proper justice to the joys of the 
Philosophy of Nature. But more importantly for our purposes,  ǯ
mention the Logic here, where it is arguable that it is in this text, rather than the 
Philosophy of Nature, that the best evidence for ǯ  
can be found. The relevant discussion is the crucial third book of the Logic, and in 
his treatment of the Concept (Begriff), Judgement, and Syllogism.  Here, Hegel 
essentially offers a hierarchy of forms of judgement and syllogism, based on how 
they treat the r    ǲǳ of universal, 
particular and individual. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the judgements and 
syllogisms of existence respectively, where there is at best a superficial relation 
between individual and universal, as the latter forms an accidental property of  ǡ ǤǤ ǲ   ǳ. Hegel then moves through other forms of 
judgement and syllogism, as this relation becomes more substantial, until the 
subject-term of the judgement deals with a natural kind, and the predicate is 
essential to individuals of this kind. The corresponding syllogism concerns the 
genus to which the individual belongs, and properties that are essential to 
members of that genus, ǤǤ    ǲGaius is a man; men are 
mortal; therefore 
ǳ. 
Now, it is precisely at this point, when a judgement introduces reference 
to the kind to which the individual belongs, that Hegel brings in value and 
normativityǤǡǲjudȏȐǳ are 
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normative judgements concerning the individual based on how well or badly it 
exemplifies the universal that constitutes its nature, e.g.  ǲThis house, lacking a ǡ  ǳ. So, while at the simplest and most basic level, judgements and 
syllogisms involve claims about individuals and their simple properties, Hegel 
holds that it is not possible to rest at merely this level of judgement and 
syllogism. Rather, it is necessary to bring in more sophisticated forms of thought, 
involving more complex conceptual structures, to make sense of the world. In 
particular, it is necessary to thinking of some individual objects as instantiating 
natural kinds which characterize their essential natures, where this introduces a 
significant evaluative element. For, to understand a concept as representing a 
natural kind is to understand individuals falling under that kind in terms of 
certain characteristics; failing to possess those characteristics is then a fault in 
the individual qua member of the kind. So, for example, a rose that dies 
prematurely, or which fails to attract sufficient bees to be pollinated, or is ǡǮǯe. These norms are 
not based on mere statistical generalizations, but reflect claims about what it is 
for a rose of this species to be a proper exemplar of its kind. Thus, for Hegel, 
value and normativity enters in as a consequence of his conception of the 
relation between individuals and their fundamental natures. The question of 
their goodness ǡǲǳǲǳ, for him seems 
to rest on this relation: 
[T]he subject then expresses the relation of that particularity to its 
constitution, i.e. to its ǡǡǥ
content of the predicate (this Ȃ the immediate individuality Ȃ house Ȃ 
genus Ȃ, so and so constituted Ȃ particularity Ȃ, is good or bad) Ȃ apodictic 
judgment. Ȃ All things are a genus (their determination and purpose) in 
one individual actuality with a particular constitution; and their finitude 
consists in the fact that what is their particular [character] may or may 
not be adequate to the universal.10 
                                                        
10 EL §179. Cf. SL 349/585:  ȋǲǡǡ
goodǡǳǲǡconstituted, is ǳȌǡfirst, the universal, 
or what it ought to be, second, its constitution; the latter contains the ground why 
a predicate of the judgement of the concept does or does not pertain to it, that is, 
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According to the Logic, it appears, evaluative judgements only make sense by 
bringing in a consideration of what it is to be a properly functioning member of a 
kind, which realizes itself in this way. 
Now, iǯ
the neo-Aristotelianism of writers such as Foot and Thompson.11 For, Foot and 
Thompson have argued that this is the best way to understand the operation of 
normativity in Aristotle as well. Thus, for example, Foot writes: ǲȏȐ ǳ, as I define it, which is attributable only to living 
things themselves and to their parts, characteristics, and operations, is   Ǯǯ        ǮǯǥǤThus evaluation 
of an individual living thing in its own right, with no reference to our 
interests or desires, is possible where there is intersection of two types of 
propositions: on the one hand, Aristotelian categorials (life-form 
descriptions relating to the species), and on the other, propositions about 
particular individuals that are the subjects of evaluations.12  
So, it would appear, ǯǡa proper use of concepts Ȃ 	ǯǡǲǳ-- must involve an implicit normativity, 
as it requires thinking of things as members of natural kinds and this itself 
requires thinking of them as good or bad exemplars of their kinds, in a way that 
appears to be fundamentally Aristotelian. 
 
5. Hegel, McDowell, Pippin 
So where does this brief investigation i ǯ    
value leave us in the debate between McDowell and Pippin? On the face of it, it 
suggests that for Hegel a kind of Aristotelian naturalism is inescapable. This is 
not the first kind of naturalism that McDowell rejects, whereby an appeal to the ǲǳ ethics, as a way of persuading the non-moral agent to be 
                                                                                                                                                              
whether the subject corresponds to its concept or not. This judgment is now 
truly objective; or it is the truth of the judgment in general. 
11 Cf. Thompson 2008: 12:  ǲǳǲǳǲǳȋ- or ill-advised such a thing might be) must see itself as ǥ 
12 Foot 2001: 26-7 and 33. See also Thompson 2008: 80-1. 
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moral. Here Pippin and McDowell agree that, like Aristotle, He  ǲǳ as providing a prior context of education and enculturation, within which 
this kind of question does not arise Ȃ or, if it does, cannot really be answered. 
Still, naturalism can serve the second role McDowell sǡǲǳ us 
that ethical life is along the right lines, by appeal to a conception of what it is to 
be a good or a bad human being, qua exemplar of that kind, where this kind of 
normativity is an inescapable aspect of our thinking at any satisfactory level: To 
have the concept of a human being is to have the concept of what it takes to be a 
properly developed human being, against which our practices can be assessed. 
This view would seem to fit the McDowellian picture rather well. 
However, there is a clear line of response from Pippin, which gets at the 
heart of his argument foǲǳ. For, even if what I have said 
about the Logic is right, this ǯ      naturalist in any 
serious sense, as it is not in terms of our natural kind that we are assessed as 
good or bad in this way, as plant or animals might be. So, what it is to be a good 
dog may require the dog to have certain features or to realize certain capacities: 
Fido is better qua dog than Rex because Fido has four legs not just three, is able 
to run better as a result, is therefore more likely to breed successfully, and so on. 
This judgment       ǲ ǳ of dogs, i.e. 
what they are charaǲǳ by nature. But for us (Pippin can rightly 
argue) it iǣǲǳ us all sort of things, but whether 
our life goes well or badly is largely independent of that, so a very different kind 
of normativity is invoǡǲspecies ǳ . ǡǡǡǯǡmate successfully, it is not 
clear that this marks   ǲǳ or failing to flourish in any sense; only a 
misplaced biologism could make it seem otherwise. Precisely because (as Pippin Ȍǲǳǲǳ of nature, this kind of claim is inappropriate for 
us. Thus, while thǲǳ for dogs or beavers or ǲǳǲproper functioniǳ, there is no 
such thing in our case.  We are in the realm of spirit and not nature; our norms 
must be self-ǲǳ our being in the world. 
However, while this worry marks an important difference between us and 
other natural beings, it is not clear how much it ultimately matters from the 
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perspective of reading Hegel as a perfectionist and as a kind of naturalist. For, it ǯ
be those that would be identified in purely biological terms,13 he still thinks there 
are such essential properties, which can ground the normative claims he wants 
to make. In this respect, it is usefuǲǳ  ǲǳ: while one can think of the former in purely biological terms, 
associated with various sort of biological functioning, the latter is a different 
notion that brings in a different conception of proper functioning and thus 
normativity, while equally characterizing me as a substance universal. Thus, ǲǳ may not be a natural kind in the biological sense 
(it is not needed as part of biological taxonomy), it is still a natural kind in the 
philosophical sense, out of which a related kind of normativity can be built, qua 
good or bad exemplifications of personhood. In this way, our fundamental 
difference from animals can be marked. For them normativity only operates at 
the level of their natural kind, while for us the logical structure of normative 
claims as based on the essential nature of the individual can still be maintained. 
 Now, I would like to suggest, something very close to this structure can be   ǯ treatment of normativity in his Philosophy of Right, where the 
key starting point is his characterization of our nature as that of free rational 
agents, which in turn leads him to the will, and what it is to be an agent with a 
will that is properly structured (cf. PR §§5-7).14  ǡ  ǡ ǯ 
any purely biological taxonomy. ǡ  ǯ     
denying that for us as agents rather than as merely human beings biologically 
conceived, there is a good and bad way for us to be, particularly concerning the 
structure of our wills. Indeed Hegel argues that the structure of the will should 
involve a characteristic kind of unity of different elements that is a commonplace 
of the perfectionist tradition.15 
To see how this approach is compatible with an essentially Aristotelian 
outlook, compare it with ǯǯǣ 
                                                        
13 Cf. Rand forthcoming. 
14 Cf. PR §§5-7. 
15 For further discussion, see Stern 2015.  
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(1) Human nature consists in rational agency, that is, in exercising the 
capacity to guide behaviour by practical reason. (2) The human good 
consists in the full actualization of this capacity in fulfilling our other 
capacities. (3) The virtues are the different ways of actualizing this 
capacity.16 
It seems clear that one can commit to ȋ ?Ȍǲǳ here is 
being used in purely biological terms. Arguably it is this that Kant helped Hegel 
to see, in a way that then took his perfectionism in a particular direction, Ǣǯ
Hegel in this way is very different from PippinǯǤ 
It therefore makes sense to claim that Hegel has a perfectionist picture of 
self-actualization or self-realizationǡ    ǲǳ is not conceived in 
narrowly biologistic terms. In one sense, then, Pippin is right in claiming that ǲǳ is more than nature qua biology ǲǳ as discussed in the Philosophy of 
Nature. But taking the Logic seriously can also show that he is wrong on the 
deeper point (which I think McDowell would be happy to accommodate): Hegel 
remains a perfectionist and naturalist of sorts, with a fundamentally Aristotelian 
picture at the centre of his thinking. On this basis, therefore, I would claim that ǯ     the perfectionist tradition, and the 
perfectionists that came after him, particularly Marx and the British Idealists, can 
be said to have been following in his footsteps. 
But, it could be asked, what happens to two fundamental features of ǯ    ǣ ǡ    -legislation and 
hence autonomy, and the emphasis on the significance of history to the Hegelian 
conception of normativity and to The Philosophy of Right itself? Surely both are 
essential to any properly recognizably Hegelian approach? My brief response to 
the first question is that the issue concerning self-legislation and particularly its 
supposed link to autonomy is much more complex and contestable than this 
suggests, as I have argued at length elsewhere (Stern 2012). And on the question  ǡ           ǲǳ       . Woodǯ  echoes ǯǲ
                                                        
16 Irwin 2009: 882. 
 20   ǳ    good: ǲHistoricized naturalism has no 
general conception of the human good, but for any infant it will be born into a 
determinate social and historical situation, inheriting from its culture a 
determinate human self-ǳǡ      ǲȏȐistoricized 
naturalism tells us to choose the childrearing practices that will actualize the self 
of the newborn child on that understandingǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ 33-34, my emphasis). ǡǯ
supposed historicism. For, it seems to me that while it is right that for Hegel, self-
actualization may occur equally well within different social practices in different 
societies at levels below those outlined in the Philosophy of Right, it is still the 
case that the fundamental structure of the will that is presented in the 
Introduction to that text is the same and fixed, as are the fundamental social 
structures which Hegel takes to realize that will; they are therefore not 
warranted merely as the form of institutional structure that best fit the 
conception of our nature prevalent at that historical period. I find no suggestion   ǯ       ǯ Ǥ  
argue instead that the importance of history for Hegel lies in helping us to see 
how this form of self-understanding has been developed, and thus how this 
distinctiv          ǲǳǡǲǳǲǳǢ 
the ratio cognoscendi not the ratio essendi of what it is to be a free rational 
agent. Moreover, taken in this way, one can also make sense of the fundamental 
Hegelian thought that the history of a certain sort of philosophical project might Ǯǯǡ
agency has finally come into view, which enables us to properly reflect on our 
ethical and social practices in the way that The Philosophy of Right tries to do.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
One way to focus the issues that I have been addressing is to consider the ǯǣ 
We can now see the outlines of a difficulty ǯǤ
to a community of Hegelian anorexics, each identifying profoundly with 
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their acts of self-starvation, and finding recognition and validation from 
others in their community. The practice of giving and asking for reasons 
operates within such a community, and anorexic reasons are recognized 
as genuine reasons Ȃ relative to the distinctive values that structure this 
particular local world. Members of the community risk their lives, to be 
sure, but they do so in pursuing something that they value above mere 
biological existence. To round out the Hegelian picture we can add in a 
reflective apologist, constructing just-so historical narratives that 
celebrate the anorexic   ǲ   of natural ǳ --      ǯ 
from its merely animal nature. Does the Hegelian have to concede that 
anorexia has here become a paradigm of modern free agency? (Martin 
2010: 290) 
Martin brings out nicely,  ǡ      ǲ  ǳ    ǡ       ǯ
account for a basis for normativity in the conditions for flourishing rational 
agency itself, not just in the kind of dialectical historical narrative that we may be 
able to tell about our practices. In this way, it could be argued, we properly 
respect the way in which Hegel harnessed the insights not only of the moderns, 
but of the ancients too.17 
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